Analysis of Nash equilibria in energy markets with large populations of price-responsive flexible appliances by De Paola, A et al.
Analysis of Nash Equilibria in Energy Markets with Large Populations
of Price-Responsive Flexible Appliances
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Abstract— This paper deals with flexible electrical devices
that, on the basis of a broadcast price signal, schedule their
individual power consumption in order to minimize their
energy cost. If the devices population is sufficiently large to
be described as a continuum, it is possible to provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in the energy market. This is done by comparing two functions
which characterize, respectively, the valley capacity of the
inflexible demand and the global properties of the appliances
population. The equilibrium conditions, which do not require
any iterative procedure to be applied, are finally tested in
simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following recent trends in the evolution of power systems,
it is expected that in the near future a considerable number
of flexible devices (e.g. “smart appliances” and electric vehi-
cles) will participate in system operation by scheduling their
power consumption during the day. The potential advantages
of this scenario, such as reduction of costs for the customers
and flattening of demand profile, have been studied in detail
[1], [2]. On the other hand, significant challenges arise if one
considers the management of these devices. In particular, in
order to avoid synchronicity phenomena characterized by the
whole population operating at low prices and shifting the
peak demand, it is important to account for the energy price
variations introduced by the aggregate power consumption
of the appliances. This problem can be approached with
centralized techniques, solving a global optimization which
accounts for objectives and constraints of customers and
generators, as proposed in [3] and [4]. Given the potential
high number of devices, privacy concerns and the traditional
tendency of private customers to fully control their operation
strategy, distributed approaches have also been considered.
For example, [5] adopts the concept of congestion pricing
and proposes an adaptive strategy based on price feedbacks.
A two-level iterative process with Lagrangian relaxation is
considered in [6] to integrate flexible demand in the energy
market while [7] applies game theory to determine the power
profile of the devices as the best response to certain tariffs.
This approach is extended in [8] approximating the popula-
tion size as infinite, neglecting the contribution of the single
device and modelling the problem as a mean field game.
Interesting techniques have been proposed for the specific
scenario of electric vehicles integration in the grid: for
example in [9] the charge profile of the vehicles is calculated
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through an iterative strategy which converges to equilibrium
by penalizing variations with respect to the previous iteration.
A game theory framework is also adopted in this paper,
modelling the devices as competing agents that aim to
operate at minimum cost. They do so by scheduling their
power consumption on the basis of a broadcast demand/price
signal received by some central entity. We are interested in
determining the existence of Nash equilibria in the system.
In other words, we want to understand when the power
consumption profiles of the devices, formulated on the basis
of the broadcast signal, are optimal also when the price of the
resulting aggregate demand is considered. The main element
of novelty of this work is that the proposed conditions do not
require any iteration and provide convergence to equilibrium
in one step. In particular, they are obtained comparing
two different functions: a negotiable valley capacity which
describes the capability of the system to absorb more power
while preserving an equilibrium, and a power density of task
durations which characterizes the global properties of the
appliances population.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II describes the modelling choices for the devices and the
energy market. The equilibrium conditions are introduced in
Section III and tested in simulations in Section IV. Finally,
conclusive remarks are presented in Section V.
II. MODELLING OF APPLIANCES AND ENERGY MARKET
The existence of Nash equilibria is investigated for energy
markets with price-responsive appliances. Each appliance, at
the beginning of the considered time interval [0,T ], broad-
casts to a central entity (e.g. the system operator) the total
energy Etot that needs to consume and the minimum time tmin
required to do so by operating at rated power Pr. These pa-
rameters can describe any kind of shiftable interruptible load,
such as electric vehicles or electronics charging devices. If
the number of appliances is sufficiently large to be described
as a continuum, we can derive the unnormalized distribution
m of the parameters within the population. In particular,
the integral
∫ t2
t1
∫ E2
E1
m(t,E)dE dt represents the number of
devices for which t1 ≤ tmin ≤ t2 and E1 ≤ Etot ≤ E2. For the
purposes of the present work, the properties of the appliances
population can be summarized by the function f (t), which
denotes the aggregate amount of energy required by the
appliances with tmin ≤ t, and its derivative f ′. Denoting by E
an interval which includes all broadcast values of Etot , they
can be defined as:
f (t) :=
∫ t
0
∫
E
m(τ,E)E dE dτ f ′(t) :=
∫
E
m(t,E)E dE (1)
Assumption 1: The derivative f ′(t) =
∫
E m(t,E)E dE is
assumed of compact support:
F = supp( f ′) = [qmin,qmax]
This can correspond to a scenario of heterogeneous ap-
pliances with different parameters tmin and Etot but can
also represent the case of homogeneous devices which, at
the beginning of the considered time interval [0,T ], are
performing distinct tasks that require different amounts of
time to be completed.
Regarding the modelling of the energy market, we con-
sider an aggregate demand Da in the power system which has
two distinct components: an inflexible power demand profile
Di(·), assumed to be known without uncertainties, and the
flexible demand D f (·) which represents the aggregate power
consumption of the appliances population and will be defined
later on. The energy price p(t), at a given time instant t, is
modelled as a strictly monotonically increasing function Π
of the current aggregate demand:
p(t) =Π(Da(t)) (2)
It is assumed that each appliance schedules in advance
its power consumption u according to a demand function
D(t) (or the corresponding price Π(D(t))) received from the
mentioned central entity. In particular, it minimizes the cost
of completing the desired task within the time interval [0,T ]:
min
u(·)
∫ T
0
Π(D(t)) ·u(t)dt
s. t. 0≤ u(t)≤ Etot
tmin∫ T
0
u(t)dt = Etot
(3)
One can verify that the solution to (3) corresponds to
operate, at rated power Pr = Etottmin , during the tmin hours with
lowest broadcast demand D (or equivalently with lowest price
Π(D)). To provide a formal expression of the optimal power
consumption profile, the following assumption is crucial:
Assumption 2: The broadcast demand is a continuous
function D : [0,T ]→ [0,+∞) with no level sets of positive
measure. For any d ∈ Im(D) = [dmin,dmax], it holds:
µ ({τ ∈ [0,T ] : D(τ) = d}) = 0 (4)
where µ denotes the Lebesgue measure.
This assumption is not very restrictive and holds in gen-
eral for typical profiles of inflexible demand, which will
be considered later on when determining the equilibrium
conditions. We now introduce the following quantity:
Definition 1: Given a broadcast demand profile
D : [0,T ]→ [0,+∞), it is possible to specify the associated
function QD : [dmin,dmax]→ [0,T ], defined as:
QD(d) := µ ({τ ∈ [0,T ] : D(τ)≤ d}) (5)
The function QD returns the measure of the sublevel sets
of the demand D. Under Assumption 2, QD is continuous,
strictly monotone increasing and takes the following values
at the endpoints of its domain:
QD(dmin) = 0 QD(dmax) = T (6)
It can be shown that, as a result of these properties, the
optimal power profile of each device is unique. In fact, for
all values of tmin, there exists a sublevel set of D of measure
tmin that we denote by SD(tmin) and define as follows:
SD(tmin) = {t ∈ [0,T ] : QD(D(t))≤ tmin} (7)
Considering expression (5) and Assumption 2, it holds:
D(t1)< D(t2) ∀t1 ∈SD(tmin) ∀t2 ∈ [0,T ]\SD(tmin) (8)
The optimal power consumption profile u∗ for devices with
tmin = s and Etot = x, when the demand D is broadcast, can
then be defined as:
u∗(t,s,x) =

x
s
if t ∈SD(s)
0 if t /∈SD(s)
(9)
As mentioned before, given that µ(SD(s)) = s, the single
device will operate at rated power Pr = xs during the s hours
characterized by lowest demand and price.
An alternative representation of the optimal power profile
can be derived if one introduces the variable q, defined as
the measure QD(D(t)) obtained evaluating (5) for d = D(t).
In this case the optimal power u¯∗ of the individual device
with tmin = s and Etot = x can be defined as follows:
u¯∗(q,s,x) =

x
s
if q≤ s
0 if q > s
(10)
This notation can be extended to the aggregate power density
g¯ consumed by the devices with tmin = s, as a function of q:
g¯(q,s)=
∫
E
u¯∗(q,s,x) ·m(s,x)dx=

f ′(s)
s
if q≤ s
0 if q > s
(11)
By taking the integral of g¯ over the different minimum times
tmin, we obtain the expression of the flexible demand D¯ f
generated by the appliances population when D is broadcast:
D¯ f (q) =
∫ T
0
g¯(q,s)ds =
∫ T
q
f ′(s)
s
ds (12)
Remark 1: The optimal power consumption profile u∗, the
aggregate power density g and the flexible demand D f as
functions of time can always be obtained by evaluating the
corresponding expressions in the q variable at q=QD(D(t)):
u∗(t,s,x) = u¯∗(QD(D(t)),s,x)
g(t,s) = g¯(QD(D(t)),s) D f (t) = D¯ f (QD(D(t)))
(13)
It is worth mentioning that, in the case of strictly increasing
broadcast demand D, the values of the time variable t and
the measure q will coincide, with q = QD(D(t)) = t.
Once the flexible demand obtained for a certain broadcast
D has been determined, it is possible to calculate the corre-
sponding aggregate profile Da,D as a function of time:
Da,D(t) = Di(t)+ D¯ f (QD(D(t))) (14)
It is of particular interest the case D=Di (when the inflexible
demand is broadcast) since in this scenario the corresponding
aggregate Da,Di depends only on the broadcast demand value
d = Di(t) through the function K(d):
Da,Di =K(d)=

d if QDi(d)> qmax
d+
∫ qmax
qmin
f ′(s)
s
ds if QDi(d)< qmin
d+
∫ qmax
QDi (d)
f ′(s)
s
ds if QDi(d) ∈ supp( f ′)
(15)
III. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
It is desirable to understand under which conditions a Nash
equilibrium is achieved in the energy market. In particular
we want to determine, if they exist, the broadcast profiles D
such that the corresponding u∗ of all devices are optimal
power schedules also for the resulting aggregate demand
Da,D. In other words all the appliances, which have optimized
their power consumption considering the broadcast D, will
have no unilateral interest in changing it in response to
the variation of prices induced by considering the aggregate
demand. The analysis of the equilibria will be carried out by
comparing two different functions in the variable q which are
related to the chosen broadcast profile and to the properties
of the appliances population.
Consider that high penetration of flexible demand has the
potential of transforming valleys of the broadcast demand
signal into peaks of the aggregated demand profile. In
this case the decentralized power scheduling computed by
the appliances is suboptimal and constantly susceptible to
renegotiation in a way that forbids convergence to a well
defined power consumption profile. For a given D, it is
possible to quantify the amount of flexible demand that can
be greedily allocated by the appliances while preserving the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. We name this quantity the
negotiable valley capacity, and define it as follows:
Definition 2: Given a broadcast demand profile
D : [0,T ]→ [0,+∞) which fulfils Assumption 2, we
define the negotiable valley capacity as the function
ΛD : [0,T ]→ [0,+∞) presented below:
ΛD(q) : q→ ddqQ
−1
D (q)
Note that such definition does not depend on the energy price
Π and represents an indicator of the flexible power density
that can be allocated in the valleys of the broadcast D.
In a similar way, it is possible to describe how a certain
population of appliances will allocate their power consump-
tion u as a function of q, based on the distribution of the
parameters tmin and Etot . Introducing the notion of power
density at q, the following definition can be provided:
Definition 3: For a given distribution m of the appliances
parameters, we define the power density of task durations as
the function Λ f : [qmin,qmax]→ [0,+∞) given below:
Λ f : q→ f
′(q)
q
=
∫
E m(q,E)E dE
q
Notice that Λ f (q) = f
′(q)
q is a density function which quan-
tifies the total rated power of the appliances with equal
parameter q = tmin. Therefore, given q1,q2 ∈ supp( f ′), the
integral
∫ q2
q1 Λ f (τ)dτ is equal to the aggregate rated power
of the appliances with tmin ∈ [q1,q2]. It will be shown in the
rest of this section how necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of a Nash equilibrium can be provided by
comparing the values of ΛDi and Λ f .
If one initially considers the problem in the time variable
t, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if the flexible demand
scheduled on the basis of the a priori broadcast price signal
Π(D) is also optimal for the a posteriori price signal (viz.
taking into account the sum Da,D of the inflexible and flexible
demand). This is equivalent to impose that the following
holds for all Etot = x ∈ E and tmin = s ∈ [qmin,qmax]:
min
u(·)
∫ T
0
Π(Da,D(t))u(t)dt =
∫ T
0
Π(Da,D(t)))u∗(t,s,x)dt
s. t. 0≤ u(t)≤ x
s∫ T
0
u(t)dt = x
(16)
Remark 2: An alternative economic interpretation can be
provided if, rather than analysing the population behaviour
within a game theory framework, we consider all appliances
as price-elastic individual consumers, viewing the exchanged
power at each time instant as a commodity. The single device
has no significant impact on the final energy price, implying
that (16) characterizes a competitive equilibrium.
Given the optimality of the power profile u∗ for (3), its
expression provided in (9) and the monotonicity of the price
function Π, the following is verified for all tmin ∈ supp( f ′):
D(t1)≤ D(t2) ∀t1 ∈SD(tmin) ∀t2 ∈ [0,T ]\SD(tmin)
In the same way, u∗ is a solution of the optimization problem
in (16) if and only if a similar inequality holds for all
tmin ∈ supp( f ′):
Da,D(t1)≤ Da,D(t2) ∀t1 ∈SD(tmin) ∀t2 ∈ [0,T ]\SD(tmin)
(17)
It is shown now that an alternative formulation of the Nash
equilibrium condition (16) can be provided in the variable q
when the inflexible demand is broadcast to the devices:
Theorem 1: Consider a profile D which is equal to the
inflexible demand Di and fulfils Assumption 2. The equilib-
rium condition (16) is satisfied for D = Di if and only if:
Λ f (q)≤ ΛDi(q) ∀q ∈ [qmin,qmax] = supp( f ′) (18)
Proof: When D = Di, the inflexible demand can be
considered as a function D¯i(q) = Q−1D (q) of the measure q
since by definition Q−1D (q) =Q
−1
Di (q) returns the value of Di
at a given q. As a preliminary result, we show that condition
(18) is equivalent to impose that the aggregate demand
D¯a,Di(q) = D¯i(q)+ D¯ f (q) is a nondecreasing function on the
support of f ′. If one considers Definition 3 and equation (12),
it is straightforward to verify that the left member in (18)
corresponds to the derivative of D¯ f (q) with changed sign.
Similarly, the term ΛDi in (18) is equal to the derivative of
D¯i. The inequality (18) can then be written as follows:
D¯′a,Di(q) = D¯
′
i(q)+ D¯
′
f (q)≥ 0 ∀q ∈ [qmin,qmax] (19)
To verify that such condition is necessary and sufficient for
a Nash equilibrium when Di is broadcast, the equivalent in
time can be considered:
Da,Di(t1)≤ Da,Di(t2) ∀(t1, t2) :
 Di(t1)< Di(t2)QDi(Di(t1)) ∈ supp( f ′)QDi(Di(t2)) ∈ supp( f ′)
(20)
In fact, to each t1 and t2 as specified above can be associated
q1 = QDi(Di(t1)) and q2 = QDi(Di(t2)) which belong to the
support of f ′ and with q1 < q2. From (19) it follows that:
Da,Di(t1) = D¯a,Di(q1)≤ D¯a,Di(q2) = Da,Di(t2) (21)
Consider now the equilibrium condition presented
in (17): taking into account the definition of SD,
it can be seen that it must be verified for all
(t1, t2) ∈ ([0,T ]× [0,T ])\(Tmin∪Tmax) with Di(t1)≤Di(t2),
where Tmin and Tmax are defined as follows:
Tmin := {(t1, t2) : QDi(Di(t1))< qmin∧QDi(Di(t2))< qmin}
Tmax := {(t1, t2) : QDi(Di(t1))> qmax∧QDi(Di(t2))> qmax}
(22)
Within the pairs of time instants to be considered,
the two cases with respectively QDi(Di(t1)) < qmin and
QDi(Di(t2))> qmax are always verified when (18) holds. For
the first case, notice that K(Q−1Di (q)) = D¯a,Di(q), correspond-
ing to the aggregate demand at t when QDi(Di(t)) = q, is
monotonic increasing from (15) on [QDi(Di(t1)),qmin] and
from (19) on [qmin,QDi(Di(t2))]. A similar proof can be
provided when QDi(Di(t2))> qmax. Condition (17), in the
remaining case qmin ≤ QDi(Di(t1)) < QDi(Di(t2)) ≤ qmax,
directly corresponds to the time equivalent (20) of (18),
concluding the proof.
Having verified under which conditions an equilibrium is
obtained by broadcasting the inflexible demand Di, we want
to understand if there exist other profiles that can be trans-
mitted to the appliances population when the conditions of
Theorem 1 do not hold. In this respect, we introduce the class
of profiles Di which induce the same u∗ as Di (and equal
aggregate demand) when they are broadcast. In particular,
D(·) belongs to Di if these conditions are satisfied:
{t : QD(D(t))< qmin}= {t : QD(Di(t))< qmin} (23a)
{t : QD(D(t))> qmax}= {t : QD(Di(t))> qmax} (23b)
QD(D(t)) = QDi(Di(t)) ∀t : QDi(Di(t)) ∈ [qmin,qmax]
(23c)
It is now possible to provide the following result:
Theorem 2: If (18) does not hold, there exists no broad-
cast profile D(·) that satisfies Assumption 2 and the equilib-
rium condition (16).
Proof: It is straightforward to verify the theorem
statement for D(·) ∈ Di since, by definition, the corre-
sponding u∗ and aggregate demand are equal to the ones
obtained broadcasting Di and therefore the results of The-
orem 1 can be extended to the present case. For a profile
D(·) /∈ Di it can be shown that, if any condition in (23)
is violated, an equilibrium is not achieved. Considering
initially that (23a) and (23b) hold while (23c) is violated,
we assume there exists t2 such that QDi(Di(t2)) ∈ [qmin,qmax]
and QDi(Di(t2))< QD(D(t2)) (the proof is similar when the
opposite inequality holds). The following sets are introduced:
Ti− := {t : qmin ≤ QDi(Di(t))≤ QDi(Di(t2))}
T− := {t : qmin ≤ QD(D(t))≤ QD(D(t2))} (24)
Evaluating the corresponding Lebesgue measures yields:
µ(Ti−) = QDi(Di(t2))−qmin < QD(D(t2))−qmin = µ(T−)
(25)
Since we are assuming that (23a) and (23b) hold, this implies
that there exists t1 ∈T−\Ti− such that:
QD(D(t1))< QD(D(t2)) QDi(Di(t1))> QDi(Di(t2))
(26)
or equivalently:
D(t1)< D(t2) Di(t1)> Di(t2) (27)
Notice now that, if the demand profile D is broadcast, for
all tmin ∈ [QD(t1),QD(t2)) it holds:
t1 ∈SD(tmin) t2 /∈SD(tmin) (28)
This means that D f (t1)> D f (t2) and therefore the following
holds for the aggregate demand:
Di(t1)+D f (t1)> Di(t2)+D f (t2) (29)
Consequently, the equilibrium condition (17), equivalent to
(16), is violated for tmin ∈ [QD(t1),QD(t2)). The proof is
concluded by showing the same results when conditions
(23a) or (23b) are violated. In these cases, it is possible to
verify that there still exist t1 and t2 for which (26) holds and
a similar procedure can then be followed.
We can finally conclude that, if the inequality (18) is sat-
isfied, an equilibrium can be achieved by broadcasting Di
or any equivalent profile which belongs to Di as defined by
(23). In the opposite case, under the current assumptions, it
is not possible to achieve an equilibrium. In this respect, it
is useful to specify the following:
Remark 3: If Assumption 2 does not hold, the optimal
power profile for each appliance is in general not unique.
The definitions of u∗ and D¯ f provided in the previous section
are no longer valid and the presented equilibrium conditions
do not apply. It will be shown in a future work that, in some
cases, it is still possible to achieve an equilibrium but an
increased level of centralization may be required.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The equilibrium conditions presented in the previous sec-
tion are now tested in simulations. A typical UK demand
profile [10] is considered for the function Di of inflexible
demand, adopting a time step ∆t = 0.01h. If one denotes by
Dki the value of inflexible demand at t = k ·∆t, the function
QDi
(
Dki
)
is approximated as
∣∣S k∣∣ ·∆t where S k is defined
as follows:
S k =
{
j : D ji ≤ Dki
}
(30)
A case study that satisfies the sufficient condition for equi-
librium in Theorem 1 is initially considered. The total
energy required by the devices amounts to 55GWh while
f ′ is assumed equal to the sum of two truncated gaussians,
centered respectively at t = 4.3h and t = 8h. A graphical
representation of the equilibrium condition is proposed in
Fig. 1 where the negotiable valley capacity ΛDi (blue) and the
power density of task duration Λ f (red) are compared. Note
that the inequality (18) is always verified and therefore we
expect a Nash Equilibrium in the market when the inflexible
demand Di is broadcast. The resulting demand profiles in
the variable q are shown in Fig. 2: given the definition of q,
when D = Di we expect D¯i(q) to be a monotonic increasing
function. Conversely, considering that devices will schedule
their power consumption at the lowest values of demand,
the flexible profile D¯ f (q) will always be decreasing. If the
equilibrium condition (18) is satisfied, like in this case, the
sum D¯a(q) of the two demand components will be a non-
decreasing function. Finally, the demand profiles across time
are presented in Fig. 3. To show that a Nash equilibrium is
achieved, the shaded blue areas represent the scheduled time
intervals of power consumption for devices with tmin equal
to 3h,5h,7h. One can notice that such intervals correspond
to the lowest values of aggregate demand.
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the equilibrium condition (18). It can
be seen that the power density of task durations Λ f (q) (red) is always lesser
or equal than the valley capacity ΛDi (q) (blue).
We simulate now a scenario for which, under the current
assumptions, a Nash equilibrium does not exist. In particular,
we consider a population of appliances that require the same
amount of total energy (equal to 55GWh) but we assume in
this case that f ′ is equal to a truncated gaussian centered
at t = 6h. We want to show that, if the power density of
task durations Λ f for the considered appliances does not fit
properly the valley capacity ΛDi of the inflexible demand,
according to Theorem 1 it is not possible to achieve an
equilibrium by broadcasting Di. A comparison of ΛDi and
Λ f in this case is provided in Fig. 4: it can be noticed
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Fig. 2. Inflexible demand D¯i and aggregate demand D¯a as functions of the
measure q = QDi (Di(t)) when the broadcast D is equal to Di. The flexible
demand D¯ f introduced by the appliances corresponds to the blue area.
Fig. 3. Inflexible demand Di and aggregate demand Da as functions of
time. The blue area represents the flexible demand D f introduced by the
appliances population. The shaded blue regions are the time intervals of
scheduled power consumption for devices with tmin equal to 3h, 5h and 7h.
that condition (18) is not satisfied. The demand profiles as
functions of the measure q when the broadcast demand D
is equal to Di are shown in Fig. 5: notice in particular
that the monotonicity properties of D¯i and D¯ f mentioned
in the previous case are still verified. The main difference
is that, in the considered scenario, the aggregate demand is
not monotonic increasing. To see that an equilibrium is not
achieved, one can consider the demand profiles as functions
of time shown in Fig. 6, where the shaded blue areas
represent, as in the previous case, the time intervals where
devices with tmin equal to 3h, 5h and 7h have scheduled
their power consumption. It is straightforward to verify, for
example, that the appliances with tmin equal to 3h and 5h
could reduce their total cost by shifting part of their power
consumption to the small aggregate demand valley which
appears around t = 6h. The possibility to converge to an
equilibrium in multiple steps, with an iterative algorithm,
has also been considered. At each iteration the aggregate
demand profile obtained at the previous step (starting with
D=Di) is broadcast to the devices. The results in Fig. 7 show
that, as expected from Theorem 2, there is no convergence
to equilibrium. At each step the appliances change their
power profile and the resulting aggregate demand, after some
iterations, switches between two distinct functions.
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Fig. 4. Graphical representation of the equilibrium condition (18). Notice
that in this case such condition is violated in the interval which goes
approximatively from q = 4.5h to q = 7h.
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Fig. 5. Inflexible demand D¯i and aggregate demand D¯a as functions of the
measure q = QDi (Di(t)) when the broadcast D is equal to Di. The flexible
demand D¯ f introduced by the appliances corresponds to the blue area.
Fig. 6. Inflexible demand Di and aggregate demand Da as functions of time.
The blue area represents the flexible demand D f introduced by the appli-
ances population. The shaded blue regions correspond to the time intervals
of power consumption of the devices with tmin equal to 3h, 5h and 7h.
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Fig. 7. Inflexible demand Di and aggregate demand Da obtained at certain
iterations of the proposed iterative procedure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyses the integration of a large number of
flexible appliances in the energy market, providing neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium. This is done by approximating the appliances
population as a continuum and abstracting its valley-filling
capabilities through a power density function. Such quantity
is then compared with the negotiable valley capacity, which
characterizes the inflexible demand. The methodology, that
does not require iterations as it provides convergence to
equilibrium in one step, is finally tested in simulations.
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